Default risk is an important concern for lenders and is a main reason they require borrowers to pledge collateral. There are two reasons for this. The …rst is that collateral provides some incentive for the borrower to not strategically default. The second is that, in the event of default, the lender can liquidate the collateral and salvage some value from the failed credit relationship. This paper provides a model to study properties of allocations that arise when collateral is part of an optimal lending contract that looks much like a repurchase agreement. In particular, a lack of commitment to future actions implies that collateral must be used to alleviate strategic default. Moreover, because collateral is held by lenders during the credit relationship, there is also a potential incentive for lenders to default on returning collateralized assets. Thus, the optimal contract requires the satisfaction of an incentive constraint for the lender, in addition 1 to the one that must be satis…ed for the borrower. The paper then discusses how the need to satisfy both constraints places certain restrictions on the allocations that arise when collateral is part of an optimal contract.
Introduction
Recent struggles in …nancial markets have drawn attention to the role of secured credit for lending activity. The declining value of collateral in …nancial markets has emphasized two important roles for collateral. First, the value to the borrower of the asset pledged as collateral has important implications for the incidence of strategic default.
Consequently, collateral provides a borrower with incentive to repay his debt. The greater the borrower's valuation of the collateral, the greater the incentive to repay to avoid forfeiting it. Second, the value to the lender of the asset pledged as collateral has important implications for the degree of insurance that collateral can provide a lender in the event of a default. The greater the lender's valuation of the collateral, the greater the level of insurance that collateral provides.
The goal of this paper is to present an environment in which collateral arises endogenously as part of an optimal …nancial contract to mitigate strategic default of borrowers and provide insurance to lenders. That is to say, the use of collateral is a necessary part of a constrained-e¢ cient solution that overcomes frictions that would otherwise prevent certain transactions from taking place. This view is similar to models with collateral that are studied in Kehoe and Levine (2008) , Rampini (2005) , and Lacker (2001) . However, it contrasts with other models that study the economic impact of collateralized lending such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) where the role for collateral is not endogenous. Notably, our approach demonstrates that collateral plays a signi…cant role in macroeconomic outcomes such as investment and risk sharing.
In the environment proposed here, we study two frictions that can give rise to collateral. This …rst is that agents cannot commit to future actions. Thus repayment of debt must satisfy incentive constraints in the spirit of Kehoe and Levine (1993) . This provides an opportunity for collateral to mitigate strategic default by strengthening borrower incentive constraints. The second is the presence of idiosyncratic risk that leads to (exogenous) default by some borrowers at the optimum. This additional risk generates an insurance role for collateral in credit arrangements.
Our model is tied to economic fundamentals in that it imposes no institutional assumptions that facilitate trade. In particular, there is no public record-keeping of agent histories (or reports of histories), no repeated relationships between a borrower and a lender, and no enforcement technology by which collateral can be seized. The lack of record-keeping and repeated interactions implies that collateral can uniquely serve to overcome a lack of commitment by borrowers. Collateral strengthens the incentive constraints pertaining to the repayment of debt. Such constraints cannot be strengthened in this model by intertemporal punishments and/or rewards as is done in the typical literature on dynamic risk-sharing with private information, or via the exclusion from future …nancial contracting as is typical in the literature on limited commitment. 1 The lack of an enforcement technology by which collateral can be seized implies that collateralized lending must work in the following way. An asset held by the borrower is transferred to the lender to serve as collateral with the expectation that the borrower buys it back in a later period. From this perspective, collateral in our model is a repurchase agreement which occurs in many real-world …nancial contracts (see Figure 1 ).
In almost all previous work on collateral, it is assumed that collateral can be seized in the event of a default. 2 Our point here is that, while it may be su¢ cient to 1 Green (1987) and Kocherakota (1996) provide examples of dynamic risk-sharing arrangements. 2 Examples include Rampini (2005) , Rampini and Viswanathan (2008) , Lustig (2007) , Kehoe and Levine (2008) , Lacker (2001) , and Krishnamurthy (2003) . assume some enforcement technology for this purpose, it is not necessary for collateral to emerge as part of an optimum. This is especially relevant if enforcement is costly as is often the case in actual bankruptcy proceedings. 3 The second complication in our model is the presence of idiosyncratic risk. Borrowers have access to a productive but risky investment technology that may be unsuccessful. Thus, even if collateral can adequately overcome incentives to strategically default, collateral can mitigate the risk to lenders if a borrower cannot repay. In our framework, collateral does not directly provide any utility to a lender but can be liquidated in exchange for money. This requires that debts be repaid with …at money, which has value to lenders because lenders can use the proceeds to acquire goods at a later date. In the event that a borrower defaults, a lender can keep the collateral and use it in a secondary market to acquire money.
Our environment contributes to the monetary theory literature that examines the interaction of money and collateralized lending. In particular, Shi (1996) and Mills provide insurance for the lender. Because there is no idiosyncratic risk that leads to default in any of these models, however, the impact of the insurance role is not studied.
Due to the lack of commitment on both sides of the …nancial transaction, the use of collateral generates an additional incentive constraint on the optimal …nancial contract beyond what is standard in the literature. 4 This incentive constraint applies to the lender and simply requires that the value of collateral to the lender not exceed the value of returning the collateral to the borrower. In our model, where the value of collateral to both the lender and the borrower is known with certainty, this incentive constraint, combined with the standard incentive constraint for the borrower, has an 3 See Bliss (2003) . 4 See, for example, Lacker (2001), Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001), Rampini (2005) , and Kehoe and Levine (2008) who study the incentive role of collateral, but not the insurance role.
implication that the optimal contract in the absence of commitment fails to provide any insurance to the borrower.
In our model, default by lenders will not happen at the optimum, but incentives to default will impact the optimal allocations. However, there are some examples in repo markets where some default by the lenders is occasionally observed. 5 This suggests that a lack of commitment by lenders in a repurchase agreement is not simply a theoretical abstraction.
In order to get a sense of how the lack of commitment and collateral a¤ect allocations, we compare certain characteristics of the optimal contract in the absence of commitment to those that arise in a setting in which there is no commitment problem. When agents can commit to future actions, strategic default is not a concern, but exogenous default remains. In this setting, the optimal contract looks more like a standard risk-sharing arrangement between the two types of agents. Not surprisingly, the absence of incentive constraints suggests that a richer set of allocations is feasible.
In contrast to the environment without commitment, both agents receive some insurance against the idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, as there are fewer constraints on the allocation of collateralized assets, investment in the risky technology increases so that expected income is higher.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how our model stands in relationship to previous work on risk sharing. Next, section 3 introduces a simple model in which collateral has some value to the lender and money does not circulate.
The advantage of the framework is that it illustrates the incentive constraints on both sides of the market in the absence of commitment. Section 4 describes a full dynamic model with collateral. This framework incorporates monetary settlement of successful credit transactions, and the sale of collateral by lenders in the event of unsuccessful credit transactions. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix describes the optimal contract when agents can commit to future actions and some properties of optimal allocations 5 See Jordan and Jordan (1997) and Garbade (2006) . Default in this market really means that creditors may choose to intentionally fail to return collateralized assets at the scheduled time in repurchase agreements. The penalties for doing so are usually just that the borrower does not have to pay the interest on the loan. are presented. It also provides a comparison of the optimal contracts with and without commitment.
Related Literature
As explained in the introduction, the presence of the risky technology leads to a desire for risk-sharing arrangements in our framework. Notably, (exogenous) default by some borrowers will occur. Consequently, …nancial contracts in our model will be designed to provide lenders with insurance against default risk. Yet, there is an additional constraint on contractual arrangements -lenders cannot commit to future actions.
The inability to commit has important implications for risk-sharing in our framework.
To better understand the contributions of our work, we brie ‡y review how the features of our model stand in relationship to previous studies of risk-sharing. In risksharing models, consumers typically face a stochastic endowment process. From this central source of uncertainty, there are essentially two categories of risk sharing models.
First, Kocherlokota (1996) is closest to our framework in that his model has two risk-averse agents who both lack the ability to commit to future actions. Kehoe and Levine (2001) also study a similar setting. A second strand, the focus of work by Aiyagari and Williamson (2000) and Krueger and Uhlig (2006) , looks at models with competitive intermediaries. Models in the latter category are principal-agent problems in which a risk-neutral principal o¤ers insurance contracts to agents who can walk away from …nancial contracts at any time. Thus, in these models, there are substantial di¤erences in attitudes toward risk between the principal and the agent and asymmetric levels of commitment since the principal is assumed to be able to commit to contractual arrangements.
In contrast to models with competitive intermediaries, we study bilateral credit relationships between a borrower and a lender. Moreover, there are three key features of our framework. First, both the lender and the borrower (which represents the agent in models of competitive intermediaries) are risk averse. Second, in contrast to standard risk-sharing models of endowment economies, we study an economy with two di¤erent types of storage technologies. One of the storage technologies has a stochastic return, leading to a desire for risk-sharing. Finally, both the borrower and lender can walk away from …nancial obligations. Thus, in contrast to standard dynamic contracting settings, neither party to a contract can commit to future actions -that is, we study an economy with double lack of commitment.
In risk-sharing models, contracts need to be designed so that agents do not have incentive to renege from their obligations. In order for contracts to be incentive compatible, there must be some form of punishment. As we describe below, our framework does not rely on an exogenous enforcement mechanism which is often involved. In models such as Kocherlakota with two risk averse individuals, should an agent deviate, the other refuses to trade ever again. In a similar vein, Aiyagari and Williamson assume there is in…nite market punishment. By comparison, Krueger and Uhlig do not rely on in…nite market punishment -only in…nite punishment by the intermediary that has experienced default by the agent. However, incentive compatibility may still be sustained if the individual incurs a switching cost in the process of establishing an arrangement with another intermediary.
Switching costs act as an enforcement mechanism since the defaulting borrower would incur a cost after they terminate a credit relationship. By comparison, individuals in our model incur a cost through the transfer to the lender once a credit relationship is initiated. Individuals with successful returns have the option to buy the transfer back. That is, they do not incur the loss if they repay the lender. Alternatively, costs are born up-front, but may be recovered at a later point.
Moreover, as previously stated, both the borrower and lender are risk averse in our model. By comparison, in both Aiyagari and Williamson and Kruger and Uhlig, the principal is risk-neutral. Thus, it is only required that defaulting agents incur a signi…cant loss in order for …nancial transactions to take place. However, in our framework, lenders must obtain some form of income in the event of default since they are risk averse. Consequently, credit arrangements must be collateralized. Moreover, lenders do not have the ability to seize income from borrowers ex-post. This implies the collateralized credit arrangements take the form of a repurchase agreement.
In many models of collateral such as Lacker (2001) , collateral is extracted if the borrower defaults on a loan. This is typical of "small value"loans between a bank and a consumer. However, this is often a costly process, involving an outside party such as a court to enforce such a transfer. There are also "large value" loans between two di¤erent …nancial institutions. In contrast to a mortgage, for example, loans between …nancial institutions may be for short periods of time such as overnight or thirty days.
Since the length of the loan is short and the amount of funds provided is signi…cant, loans between institutions often involve a transfer of collateral at the time a loan is originated. This economizes on the costs of credit transactions by eliminating the need to use an outside party to enforce a contract. Our framework captures this idea by assuming that exogenous enforcement is not possible. Thus, secured credit in our framework takes the form of a repurchase agreement which is an important source of funding for shadow banking institutions. 6 Finally, we note that …nancial settlement occurs in monetary terms in our model.
In this manner, our work follows Reed and Waller (2006) by illustrating how the ability to trade with …at money could a¤ect risk sharing. However, in their analysis, intertemporal punishments are not possible. In contrast, the ability to collateralize credit arrangements provides incentives to avoid strategic default in our model. In addition to the endowments of goods and , there are also two agent-speci…c storage technologies involving good . The type A agent has access to a potentially productive investment opportunity. That is, the type A individual can allocate good to a productive, yet risky, investment technology. With probability (1 ), the investment technology generates R units of in period 2: However, with probability , the investment is unproductive and does not yield any output.
On the other hand, the type B individual only has a storage technology. In comparison to A, its return is deterministic. Each unit only yields one unit in period 2. On average, the investment technology a generates higher return than B's storage technology. That is, R > . Good perishes at the end of period 1.
As we will describe below, the di¤erent investment opportunities between the two agents provides incentives for them to trade so that resources are channeled to those that yield a high return, but also provide insurance between them. On the one hand, A is an "entrepreneur" seeking "capital" to yield high returns. Yet, the type B is a "capitalist"who requires some compensation for the risk. This can occur by accepting some from A as collateral. Moreover, since B's technology is safe, the opportunity to allocate resources to B may provide A with the ability to diversify his capital.
Timing of Events
The sequence of events is as follows. In period 1, the type A agent is matched with the type B agent. Two activities can take place at this meeting. The …rst is a potential transfer of some of the good from the B to the A agent. In this manner, B potentially transfers some capital to A. The second is an allocation of good into the two agent-speci…c technologies. An amount,
x, can be transferred from A to B to be allocated to the (safe) storage technology. Thus, A potentially transfers some of his good as collateral to be held by B. The remaining x is then invested in the A's risky technology. We assume that good perishes at the end of period 1, so this is the only opportunity for A to acquire and consume some of good . Both agents consume their allocation of good before the end of period 1.
In period 2, the return on the risky investment is realized. With probability ;the A agent does not have any good while with probability 1 , the A agent has R(x ) of good .
In period 3, the type A agent is reunited with the type B agent he met in period toA. Yet, there is also the potential for the capitalist to provide insurance to A. Let BA (0) denote the period-3 transfer of good from type B to type A in the bad state. 7 In period 4, agents consume good .
Optimal Allocation
Notation is needed to represent the amount of good agents bring to period 4 to consume. Let z (1) denote the amount of good taken to period 4 by agent z 2 fA; Bg when A's project is successful The notation z (0) represents similar allocations for the case when A's project is unproductive. Then, we can express aggregate expected utility across the two agents is:
Given the timing of events in the model, there are both feasibility and incentive constraints on the trades that can take place. We begin with period 1. The expected value of participating in trade must be at least as good as autarky. These are
for the type A agent and
for the type B agent.
There are no constraints in the second period. For period 3, …rst consider incentive constraints when A's risky technology is successful. In order for A to be willing to compensate B and reacquire his collateral, the following incentive constraint for the type A agent must be satis…ed
It follows that
which reduces to
or that the transfer from the type B agent must be at least as large as the transfer from the type A agent. That is, the value of the collateral must exceed the amount of compensation that A provides to B. This constraint re ‡ects a moral hazard problem for the entrepreneur to return income to the capitalist. This is similar to moral hazard problems in costly-state veri…cation models such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989). 8 Now, let's turn to the type B agent's incentive constraint when A's risky technology is successful. In order for B to be willing to return the collateral to A, the following must be satis…ed for type B:
which simpli…es to
or the transfer from the type A agent must be at least as large as the transfer that the type B agent requires. That is, the returns paid to B for providing A with capital must be at least as large as the value of A's collateral. Thus, our model also introduces a 8 As another example, see Bhattacharya (1998) .
moral hazard problem for the capitalist to return collateral to the entrepreneur. While the collateral was provided to the capitalist as an insurance device, ex post, it leads to a moral hazard problem as the captialist has an incentive to retain the collateral. This second lack of commitment has received little attention in models of external …nance.
One implication of the two-sided moral hazard problem, is that the two incentive constraints (4) and (5) together imply
or that the value of A's compensation to B must equal the value of the collateral.
Thus, on net, trade does not take place beyond the …rst stage when A's investment is successful. The capitalist simply keeps and consumes the collateral, and the entrepreneur reaps all the returns from the risky technology. While seeking to generate additional income by providing captial to the entrepreneur, lack of commitment on both sides prevent this from happening. Now consider the period 3 incentive constraints when A's risky technology is unsuccessful. Since the capitalist received collateral in the …rst period, he has received some insurance against this negative state. However, since the capitalist has some income from the storage technology, while the entrepreneur does not, he could signi…cantly raise the utility of the entrepreneur by making a transfer to A. However, the capitalist has no incentive to do so. Therefore,
and
Consequently the framework with double-sided lack of commitment limits risk sharing opportunities between the agents. Only the captialist receives insurance against the bad state where A's technology fails.
A Dynamic Model of Collateral with Monetary Settlement
Our initial model demonstrates how moral-hazard in both sides of funding transactions can limit risk-sharing between market participants, but it also lacks some signi…cant features which limit credit activity in practice. For example, the asset serving as collateral is often more valuable to the institution or agent seeking funds. That is, such assets have more intrinsic value to the borrower than the lender. In order to realize its full value, the lender must …nd a suitable buyer. For many types of assets that are pledged as collateral, this can be a costly activity for the lender. The initial model does not illustrate this complication as the agent supplying capital retains and consumes the collateral rather than trading it.
Furthermore, many credit transactions are settled in monetary terms. Successful credit relationships are ful…lled through monetary settlement to compensate the lender for the loan. Unsuccessful credit relationships induce a lender to sell the collateral for cash.
Environment

Preferences, Endowments and Technologies
The model is a pure exchange endowment economy of two-period-lived overlapping generations with two goods at each date, good and good . The economy starts at 
Timing of Events within a Period
The sequence of events within a period is as follows. Each period t is divided into four stages. In the …rst stage, each generation-t type A agent is matched with a generation-t type B agent. Two activities can take place at this meeting. The …rst is a potential transfer of some of the good from the B to the A agent. The second is an allocation of good into the two agent-speci…c technologies. An amount, x, can be transferred from the A to the B to be allocated to the (safe) storage technology. The remaining x is then invested in the A's risky technology. We assume that good perishes at the end of this stage, so this is the only opportunity for A to acquire and consume some of good . Both agents consume their allocation of good before the end of the …rst stage.
At the beginning of the second stage, the return on the risky investment is realized.
Then each generation-t type A is matched with a generation-t 1 type B. In a fraction of meetings the A does not have any good to o¤er and both types leave without it. In the remaining fraction 1 of meetings the A agent has R(1 ) of good to o¤er. In those meetings, good is allocated between the two agents.
In the third stage, each generation-t type A is reunited with the generation-t type B agent he met in stage 1. This meeting presents an opportunity for the agents to allocate the units of good between them. Any amount of good that goes to A is consumed by that agent while the amount of good that goes to B is carried into the fourth stage.
At the fourth stage of a period there is an aggregate meeting between all generationt type B agents and all generation-t 1 type B agents. This is the …nal chance for old B's to acquire good . The aggregate nature of the fourth stage implies that resources can be pulled together and redistributed (as in a market). There is a cost of participation for each agent, 0. 9 Finally, we assume that good perishes at the end of this stage so that it cannot be transferred to the next period.
Discussion of the Environment
It is useful to brie ‡y comment on some of the important elements of the environment.
Recall that our goal is to provide a model where collateral arises as part of an optimal contract to alleviate strategic default from borrowers, and to provide insurance to lenders in the event of any type of default.
Because there is no commitment to future actions, a young type A agent must …nd it incentive compatible to repay the loan. To get around this problem, the type A agent's endowment of good can be used as collateral. As we present in the next section, the collateral arrangement will work much like a repurchase agreement, such that the collateral is transferred from the type A agent to the type B agent in the …rst stage of the period. Because the good has value to the type A agent, there is an incentive for him to repay his debt at the third stage of the period in order to reacquire the collateral. The …rst and third stages, therefore, will correspond to the front and back ends, respectively, of a repurchase agreement. 
Optimal Allocations in the Absence of Commitment
We begin by studying …nancial arrangements in the absence of commitment. In addition to a lack of commitment, there is no public record of agents'trading histories.
These frictions combine with the speci…c sequence of events to generate a transactions role for money. 10 Goods that a type B agent o¤er a 3 (0) = 0 of good . As before, if both agents in a meeting agree, the trade takes place. Otherwise, the agents leave in autarky.
Finally, at the fourth stage of date t, all generation-t 1 and generation-t type B agents are together in a meeting. The mechanism suggests that generation-t agents with units of good o¤er them up in exchange for money. It also suggests that the generation-t 1 agents who have money balances o¤er to exchange all of their money for some of good . The total amount of money that is o¤ered by generation-t 1 agents is then evenly distributed to the generation-t agents who agreed to trade. Likewise, the total amount of good o¤ered by generation-t agents is evenly distributed to the generation-t 1 agents. Those who choose to particpate incur the cost . Those who choose not to participate in exchange do not incur and leave the meeting with autarky. The timing of events is summarized in Figure 2 .
We are now ready to present the ex-ante steady state social welfare and the relevant feasibility and incentive constraints. In what follows, we assume = 0. 12
Ex-ante steady state social welfare is:
Equation (9) represents every possible consumption opportunity for both types of agents.
The relevant constraints include a number of feasibility and incentive constraints imposed by the timing of events and the lack of full information and commitment.
In the …rst stage, there are two relevant constraints. The …rst is that the allocation of good devoted to both technologies sums to x so that
12 A previous version of this manuscript did not have a cost of participation for type B agents trading in stage 4. An anonymous referee pointed out that young type B individuals would be indi¤erent between trading in stage 3 and stage 4 in such an economy and this allowed for alternative arrangements in which collateral is not used. Introducing an > 0 relieves this indi¤erence and eliminates these alternative arrangements. Assuming = 0, however, simpli…es the presentation of the social welfare function and incentive constraints.
The second has to do with the allocation of good between the two generation-t agents:
There are also participation constraints for each type of agent. They re ‡ect that the expected value of participating in trade must be at least as good as autarky. These
for type A agents and
for type B agents.
The second stage feasibility constraint states that agents cannot leave with more of good than is available at that stage. For the 1 meetings in which there is a positive return on the risky technology, the available amount of good is just the realized return from the investment technology, R(x ). We anticipate that type B agents participate in trade so that all type B agents enter the second stage with money balances M . The feasibility constraint is then
For the meetings in which there is zero return on the risky technology, no goods can be exchanged. This means that the type A agent does not acquire money balances to take with him into the third stage and type B agents will leave the second stage with their money balances.
There are also participation constraints here as well. The …rst pertains to type A agents. A type A agent agrees to trade if
or simply
The left-hand side pertains to the fact that if the type A agent agrees to trade, he For a type B agent, the decision to participate in trade is a comparison of using her money to acquire good at the second stage, versus using her money to acquire good at the fourth stage, which can be expressed as
which, because the mechanism suggests b 4 (0) = 0 simpli…es to
Note that b 4 (M ) is the amount of good that a type B agent can expect to consume if she enters the fourth stage with money. This would be the case either if she did not have a trading opportunity in the second stage (because she was matched with a type
A agent who su¤ered a negative shock), or she chooses not to participate in a trade when there is an opportunity.
For the third stage, note that the mechanism suggests
Both suggestions are feasible and satisfy participation constraints. The fact that a 3 (0) = 0 in (17) The available good is distributed to generation-t 1 type B agents with positive money balances (a fraction of all type B agents). Recall that the mechanism suggests
for generation-t 1 type B agents who enter the fourth stage without money. As was the case with (17) , the lack of commitment and public record of transactions eliminates the possibility that generation-t type B agents give away some of good to generationt 1 type B agents at this stage. Thus, the feasibility constraint on the fourth stage is
Participation constraints for those with money and those with good are trivially satis…ed. For the generation-t agents, they wish to trade some of good when young for money used to acquire some of good when old. For the generation-t 1 agents, this is their last opportunity to acquire some of good for consumption.
Finally, we can now express the following de…nition. In order to solve this optimization problem, we set up a Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian.
We plug constraints (17)- (19) into (9) and note that (10) is already incorporated in the other constraints. Thus, we have the following Lagrangian
where 1 ; 2 ; 3 are the multipliers associated with the remaining feasibility constraints, and 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 are the multipliers associated with the remaining participation constraints. We can anticipate that 1 ; 2 ; and 3 will all be greater than zero and the associated constraints will bind. Otherwise, resources would be wasted.
The main result comes directly from the characterization of the agents'participation constraints.
Proof. First, note that (20) holds with equality so that
Because (14) holds at equality we have
(15) reduces to
Since the mechanism suggests that a 3 (M ) = , we have
Thus, constraints (21) and (23) generate the result.
Constraint (23) says that the value of collateral must be at least as large as what it will cost the borrower to obtain it. This is the incentive role of collateral. Here, a type A agent gives up b 2 (M ) to acquire money that he can use later to repay his debt and receive his collateral. Thus, the value of collateral must be at least as large as
Constraint (21) says the value of collateral to the lender must be at least as large as the value of reneging on the agreement and selling units of good at the fourth stage.
Taken together, this pins down the amount of good a type B agent acquires at the second stage when matched with a type A agent with a successful investment project.
This leads to the following corollary.
The implication is that when collateral is part of the optimal contract in this environment, the lenders, type B agents, receive the same amount of income regardless of returns from the risky project. Because a 3 (0) = 0, type A agents do not receive insurance against the intrinsic risk.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to provide an environment in which collateral arises endogenously as part of an optimal contract. In our model collateral serves two roles. The …rst role, an incentive role, is meant to deal with the typical principal-agent problem of moral hazard in …nancial contracts. Collateral must have su¢ cient value to the borrower such that he does not want to forfeit it by failing to repay a loan. Collateral also has an important insurance role. The ability to liquidate collateralized assets protects lenders from all sources of default risk, not just those due to strategic default.
Collateral must have su¢ cient value to the lender such that, in the event of default, it can be liquidated by the lender at a later date.
By studying these two roles, the model demonstrates the importance of the value of collateral to both borrowers and lenders. Thus, it provides some insight into recent struggles in …nancial markets. In particular, the value of collateralized assets declined dramatically in late 2007 and early 2008. This loss in value meant that some types of securities were no longer e¤ective at providing adequate insurance for creditors in addition to providing less incentive for borrowers to repay loans. To study these issues, our environment could be extended to add some riskiness to the value of collateral.
Collateral itself could be risky by assuming that lenders' storage technology is risky.
Alternatively, there could be some settlement shock to repayment of loans and/or access to the secondary market at the fourth stage (as in Freeman (1996) ). In any case, the value of insurance provided would be lower, perhaps leading to much larger amounts of collateral required for credit to be extended. Moreover, investment and expected income would be much lower.
Recall that the model placed no institutional assumptions on the ability to enforce or commit to transactions. Thus, the model could be extended to think about the impact of additional institutions that improve upon the allocation without committment. For example, recent growth in tri-party repos has emerged as one way to provide risk protection to both lenders and borrowers. In particular, agents that provide tri-party repo services will hold onto securities pledged as collateral, protecting the borrower from a lender's incentive to fail to return the collateral. Such …nancial services could emerge as an optimal mechanism in the model, but would likely require some more institutional assumptions.
Finally, the model could be decentralized to introduce pricing and monetary policy analysis. The standard view of in ‡ation is that it a¤ects the distribution of income in favor of borrowers at the expense of lenders. Given that the constrained-optimal allocation in our model provides little insurance to borrowers, an in ‡ationary monetary policy may undo some of that distortion. Moreover, monetary policy could also have an impact on the value of collateral in our model through its impact on incentive constraints. This would also lead to changes in the amount of investment and risksharing in credit markets.
Appendix
Optimal Allocations with Full Commitment
We characterize certain properties of optimal allocations under the assumption that agents can commit to trades. Under such an assumption, neither money nor collateral will be needed to conduct transactions. This serves as a benchmark with which to compare the properties of optimal allocations when commitment is not possible. If agents can commit, there is no need to keep track of incentive constraints. Not surprisingly, fewer constraints leads to potentially better outcomes. These outcomes resemble more risk-sharing among the type A and type B agents, and more ‡exible portfolio allocations into the two technologies.
There are two decisions that must be made. As in the previous section, the …rst is how to allocate good between the A agents' risky investment technology and B agents' safe storage technology. The second is how to allocate both types of goods among the agents given the feasibility constraints imposed by the sequence and make- We denote a (0) and b (0) as the consumption of good when in a third-stage match without a positive investment realization for the type A agent for A and B agents respectively. We denote steady-state consumption levels of good simply as a and b because these consumption levels are determined before any uncertainty is revealed.
Ex-ante expected steady state social welfare is Figure 3 summarizes the events that take place when there is commitment.
In contrast to an economy without commitment, the relevant constraints only involve feasibility constraints on trades at each stage. The …rst is that the allocation of good among the two technologies sums to x so that
The second stage feasibility constraint states that agents cannot leave with more of good than is available at that stage. For the 1 meetings in which there is a positive return on the risky technology, the available amount of good is just the realized return from the investment technology, R(x ). The feasibility constraint is then
For the meetings in which there is zero return on the risky technology, no goods can be exchanged (i.e., a 2 (0) = b 2 (0) = 0).
The feasibility constraints for the third stage are similar to those in the second stage. In this case, the amount of good available is , the amount generation-t A's gave to generation-t B's in the …rst stage. Thus, the amount of good transferred to type A agents must satisfy
for meetings in which the type A agent had a bad realization in the second stage, and
for meetings in which the A agent had a good realization in the second stage.
In the fourth stage, all of the remaining good gets transferred from the generationt B's to the generation-t 1 B's. Recall that all type B's of each generation meet at this stage. The amount of good available is that which remains after the generationt B's transferred some to generation-t A's at the third stage. A fraction, , of the generation-t B agents were in a third stage meeting with an A agent that had a bad shock and bring ( a 3 (0)) units of good to the fourth stage. Similarly, a fraction
(1 ) of generation-t B agents were in a third stage meeting with an A agent that had a good shock and bring ( a 3 (1)) units of good to the fourth stage.
The available good is distributed to two types of generation-t 1 B's: those who were matched in the second stage with a generation-t type A with a positive return on the investment technology (a fraction 1 ) and those who were matched with an A agent that did not (a fraction ). Thus, the feasibility constraint on the fourth stage is
which can be rewritten as
Finally, we have the consumption levels of good for generation-t type A agents and generation-t 1 agents denoted
Note that when generation-t A agents and generation-t 1 B agents are in a second stage meeting in which there is a positive realization of the risky investment technology, they each get two opportunities to acquire good for consumption: the second and third stages for the A agent and the second and fourth stages for the B agent. If these same agents are in a second stage meeting in which the realization from the technology is zero, however, they each only have one opportunity to acquire good : the third stage for the A agent and the fourth stage for the B agent.
From this we can form the following de…nition. In order to solve the optimization problem, we set up a Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian.
We plug constraints (31) -(34) into (24) and note that (25) is already incorporated in the other constraints. Thus, we have the following Lagrangian. 
0 with c.s.
a :
a 0 with c.s.
b :
b 0 with c.s. 
(1) 0 with c.s.
b 4 (0) 0 with c.s.
1 :
3 > 0 1 :
1 0 with c.s. It then follows from a 3 (0) > 0 and (47) that > 0:
It is immediate from Proposition 2 that at an optimal allocation with commitment both type A and type B agents consume some of good regardless of the realization of the risky technology at stage 2. Thus, both types of agents receive some insurance against the bad outcome.
Using the results of Proposition 2 we can simplify a number of …rst-order conditions.
First, we rewrite (35):
Next, we can combine (36) and (37):
a > 0 and b > 0.
Equations (38) and (39) yield:
Finally, we can combine (41) and (42):
From these simpli…ed conditions, we can present the next proposition.
Proposition 3
At an optimal allocation, 2 = 0 and constraint (48) is nonbinding.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that 2 > 0. Then condition (48) requires a 3 (1) = which is positive by Proposition 2. Then from a 3 (1) > 0 and condition (51) we get
which means that
and that by condition (52) b 4 (1) > 0. Given that by Proposition 2 b 4 (0) > 0 as well, and a 3 (1) = , condition (47) must be nonbinding and 1 = 0. Otherwise, there would be no good to distribute among the type B agents at stage four and condition (46) would not be satis…ed. Now from (54) we have
But it is assumed that
Thus, we get a contradiction and 2 = 0.
The next result comes directly from Proposition 3.
Proposition 4
An optimal allocation has the following properties: The next proposition further characterizes the optimal allocation. Now from Proposition 3 we know that a 3 (1) < x. Using 3 (1 ) < 2 we can manipulate (49) to
which, because R > 1 (1 ) means that 1 > 0. This and condition (47) imply that a 3 (0) = x > a 3 (1) and we get a contradiction.
The intuition from Proposition 5 is simple. The assumption that R > 1 (1 ) guarantees that agents prefer some positive investment in the risky technology. This means there will be some favorable outcomes in stage two and that the young Type A agents and the old Type B agents will share that favorable return at the second stage. and not all ratios of marginal rates of substitution are equal. The key result from Proposition 6 is that the stage three resource constraint binds.
Another observation is that, in the bad state, the type A agent receives his collateral back. Type A agents receive only partial insurance while type B agents receive the same amount of income regardless of the returns from the risky project. Regardless, in such a scenario, consumption smoothing among the types and the goods is not complete.
Proposition 7
An optimal allocation with a 3 (1) = b 4 (1) = 0 and 1 > 0 has the following properties: and not all of the ratios of marginal rates of substitution are equal.
Proof. If a 3 (1) = b 4 (1) = 0 then from (51), (52), and Proposition 5 require 2 <
(1 ) 3 . Given that 1 > 0 it is obvious from (47) that a 3 (0) = . Thus, from (46) we have b 4 (0) =
1
.
By a similar argument to the proof of Proposition 6 we get a 2 (1) > a 3 (0). Given 2 < (1 ) 3 it is obvious that 2 < 3 and by conditions (43) and (52) we get
As with the previous case, the stage three resource constraint binds for type A agents that had a negative realization of the investment technology. In this case, however, both type A and type B agents receive only partial insurance. However, there is still not complete consumption smoothing across agents and states. In this case the stage three resource constraint for type A agents with bad investment outcomes does not bind. Thus, the ratios of MRS are equalized across types, goods and states. This is the …rst best allocation of goods. There is only partial insurance for both types of agents.
Comparison of the Optimal Contracts
In this section, we compare the allocations that arise optimally in the absence of commitment with those that arise optimally when there is full commitment. Figure 4 summarizes the main di¤erences.
As the table makes clear, the optimal contract without commitment is much more restrictive on the allocations. This is because the incentive constraints for both type A and type B agents restrict the amount of good that goes to the type B agents to the amount of collateral that is pledged. Thus, when collateral is part of the optimal contract, the generation-t 1 type B agent receives a certain amount of good for consumption regardless of the result of their borrower's return on the investment project. Moreover, the type A agent does not receive any insurance over the risky investment technology because it would require their type B lender to commit to giving away some of good at the third stage.
When there is full commitment, it is now possible for type B agents to give away some of good to the type A agents in the third stage. This leads to partial insurance for the type A agents. As a result, the constrained-e¢ cient allocation distorts risksharing away at the expense of the type A agents to the potential bene…t of the type B agents.
A second important di¤erence is the fact that the portfolio decision of the agents between the investment technology and the storage technology is less constrained in the world without commitment. Again, because of commitment, more transfers across agents are implementable, and the amount invested in the storage technology can e¢ ciently be allocated across agents, leading to a better distribution of good between the investment technology and the storage technology.
We can summarize the cost of a lack of commitment in the following proposition.
Proposition 9
The constrained-e¢ cient outcome that arises when collateral is part of an optimal contract distorts both risk-sharing and portfolio allocations relative to the e¢ cient outcome that arises when there is full commitment. 
